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Persecution On Account Of Gender: A Need For
Refugee Law Reform
Bret Thiele*
I. INTRODUCTION
As humanity enters the twenty-first century, human rights advocates
celebrate successes achieved since the United Nation's Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.! Although this celebration is much
deserved, we advocates cannot become complacent. In addition to
recognizing past successes, we must continue to find innovative means of
promoting and protecting human rights for all people. One area in which
substantial progress can be made is in the area of refugee and asylum law.
In this regard, both international and domestic U.S. law has failed to
establish an adequate framework within which to address the unique
problems of refugee women. The purpose of this article is to address this
silence and to suggest one solution to the problems refugee women face.
Specifically, I argue that it is urgently necessary to add a gender category
to the international and U.S. definitions of refugee.
The principle that women's rights are human rights is now widely
accepted, at least at the international level of discourse. Human rights
*B.S., summa cum laude, University of Minnesota; J.D., cum laude, University of
Minnesota Law School. The author is a human rights lawyer currently working on human
rights concerns of refugees, internally displaced persons, asylum-seekers and asylees. The
author thanks Mayra G6mez for her invaluable comments, suggestions and critique. The
author also thanks Professor David Weissbrodt for all the support, guidance and
opportunities he has so generously provided and continues to provide.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 Am!I), U.N. GAOR, at 71,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Celebrations were held around the world in recognition of the
Declaration's fiftieth anniversary.
2. See Beijing Declaration and Plaform for Action, Fourth World Conference on
Women, U.N. Docs. A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995) [hereinafter
Beijing Declaration]; United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1661, 1667; Organization of
American States: Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence against Women ("Convention of Belem do Para"), 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1534.
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violations disproportionately affecting women are increasingly being
recognized. The problems caused by the disproportionate level of human
rights violations of women are becoming apparent in the area of
refugee/asylum law. While sharing the basic needs of all those who seek
asylum, women asylum applicants have particular needs and suffer
particular forms of persecution on account of gender. Furthermore, gender
inequality is itself seen as a social system of subjugation and disadvantage,
which is itself at odds with human rights norms and ideals.
Sexual assault, domestic abuse, sexual trafficking and institutionalized
gender discrimination affect women to a far greater degree than they do
men. In addition, women suffer from gender-specific persecution such as
female genital mutilation and systematic rape as a weapon of war.
Although persecution on account of gender is now being recognized by
human rights advocates, the ability to seek refuge from persecution on
account of gender has failed to develop accordingly. While part of this
lack of development reflects a more general failure within the human rights
discourse to adequately reflect the persecution of women, it also in part
results from archaic ideas of who a refugee is.
II. CURRENT DEFINITIONS OF "REFUGEE"
United States law defines "refugee" as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
3or political opinion.
By enacting the Refugee Act of 1980, which contains the above definition,
Congress sought to rationalize the existing patchwork of U.S. laws then
dealing with refugees. Congress' goal was to articulate "a coherent and
comprehensive U.S. refugee policy" that would comply fully with this
Country's obligations under the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees (Protocol).4  The Protocol defines refugee by
referring to the definition found in the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, 5 which defines refugee as any person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
3. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (West 2000).
4. See H.R. RP. No. 608, at 1, 6, 17-18 (1979).
5. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, entered into force April 22, 1954, 189
U.N.T.S. 150.
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religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to return to it.
6
This current international definition of refugee is essentially the same
as the definition originally drafted in the 1951 Refugee Convention, except
that the words "as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951" and
the words "as a result of such events" have been omitted. The current
international definition was originally drafted to address the effects of
World War II and focused specifically on the refugee crises then facing the
continent of Europe at the time. This focus limited the definition of
refugee to include only those causes most apparent in the aftermath of
World War II, specifically, persecution on account of "race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."
7
The facial gender-neutrality of the definition reflects the perspective of that
time that women and men lead identical lives and that the human condition
is unaffected by gender.
8
The gender-neutral definitions, focusing on violations committed
directly by the State against individuals and on denial of civil and political
rights, however, encompass more readily the situation of men, rather than
women, who seek protection as refugees.9 Furthermore, the international
definition was designed to address not only persecution by State actors, but
also persecution that occurred in the public realm. In fact, "[t]he typical
human rights victim is portrayed in both legal and human rights literature
as a male dissident, tortured or imprisoned by the State."10 This definition
leaves out persecution occurring in the private realm, however, which
disproportionately affects women.
The U.S. Congress has the ability to expand the definition of refugee
under U.S. law. The U.S. recognizes the Protocol, to which it acceded in
1967, as a non-self-executing treaty. As such, it is U.S. domestic law, in
this case the Refugee Act of 1980, that is binding upon the U.S. rather than
the Protocol itself. While the Protocol articulates the minimal obligations,
6. Id. ch. I, art. l(A)(2).
7. Id.
8. See Noreen Burrows, International Law and Human Rights: The Case of Women's
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM RHETORIC TO REALrTY 80-98 (Campbell et al. eds., 1986).
9. See generally Jane Connors, Legal Aspects of Women as a Particular Social Group,
1997 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. (Special Issue) [hereinafter Connors, Legal Aspects of Women as
a Particular Social Group].
10. Todd Stewart Schenk, A Proposal to Improve the Treatment of Women in Asylum
Law: "Gender" Category to the International Definition of "Refigee," 2 IND. . GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 301 (Fall 1994).
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Congress can expand the scope of the Protocol's protections by means of
domestic legislation. Indeed, the definition of refugee found in the Refugee
Act of 1980 already differs from the international definition in one
important aspect. Under the Act, a person is deemed to be a refugee if s/he
fears future persecution or because of persecution. Thus, in recognizing
past persecution as a ground for asylum, Congress expanded the
international definition of whom the U.S. considers to be a refugee. This
important precedent demonstrates Congress's ability to expand the
protections offered by the more limited international definition of refugee.
II. RECENT TRENDS
A. THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. CASE LAW
Gdmez v. INS offers an illustration of the inadequacy of the current
refugee definition. " Carmen G6mez was born and raised in El Salvador.
1 2
Between the ages of twelve and fourteen, she was raped and beaten by
guerilla forces on five separate occasions because her family did not
support the rebel faction.1 3 On each of these occasions the guerrillas
threatened her life and vandalized her home.1 4 Ms. G6mez finally fled El
Salvador in 1979 and sought refuge in the United States.
Ms. G6mez was found deportable based on her illegal entry into the
United States. 15 She declined to designate a destination to which she could
be deported. 6 When the Immigration Judge designated El Salvador, Ms.
G6mez applied for political asylum.
17
The Immigration Judge concluded that Ms. G6mez was ineligible for
political asylum because she did not meet the definition of refugee. 8 She
appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which upheld the
deportation order.19 She then appealed her case to the United States Court
of Appeals, Second Circuit.20
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Ms. G6mez's appeal.21
In doing so, the Court noted that the Immigration Judge and the BIA were
correct in finding that Ms. G6mez had not been previously abused on
account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a
11. G6mez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
12. See id. at 662.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 662-63.
19. See id. at 663.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 665.
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particular social group.22 Rather, the Court agreed that she had been
abused because she is a youthful woman and, because she was not more
likely to be abused than other youthful women, did not qualify as a
refugee.23 Such a shocking finding illustrates how U.S immigration courts
fail to recognize rape as a method of persecution, a method which in this
case clearly was used to persecute Ms. G6mez on account of an imputed
political opinion.
In Fatin vs. INS, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit analyzed whether or not an Iranian woman with western and
feminist views had a well-founded fear of persecution in Iran based on
membership in a particular social group, namely women who possess such
views and oppose Iran's strict rules of dress and conduct. 24
The court stated that Ms. Fatin did not present a well-founded fear of
persecution based on membership in a particular social group because she
did not demonstrate that she would suffer persecution different than that
imposed upon the Iranian female population as a whole.2 This conclusion
creates a troubling precedent. Because a woman seeking asylum must
show that she will be persecuted to a greater degree than the general female
population, an asylum claimant faces a much higher evidentiary burden if
she comes from a country that persecutes or allows persecution of all or
most women. Thus, the particular social group theory, when pertaining to
women, is flawed in that it accepts the universal persecution of women as
status quo, and requires the female claimant to distinguish her persecution
as greater than that of the average woman.26
Like Gdmez, Fatin illustrates the inadequate protection offered by the
current refugee regime. In Fatin, an oppressive government and society
was 'successful' in either socializing a majority of women into accepting
their persecution as normal or frightening a majority of women into silence,
or both. Because of this degree of societal-wide persecution, the court in
Fatin implied that women who refuse to quietly accept their persecution
did not fall within the scope of the U.S. definition of refugee, and thus are
not afforded protection. Fatin illustrates how the particular social group
category inadequately protects women.
In 1993, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a denial of asylum in Fisher v.
INS.27 Like Ms. Fatin, Ms. Fisher sought refuge from persecution in Iran.28
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used the persecution versus
22. See id. at 664.
23. See id.
24. Fatin vs. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
25. See id. at 1243 n.12.
26. Kristin E. Kandt, United States Asylum Law: Recognizing Persecution Based on
Gender Using Canada as a Comparison, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 137 (1995) [hereinafter
Kandt, United States Asylum Law].
27. Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1993).
28. See id.
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prosecution distinction in affirming Ms. Fisher's asylum denial.2 9 The
court stated that the BIA's conclusion that, although enforcement of Iran's
dress and conduct rules "may seem harsh by Western standards, it does not
rise to the level of persecution' '30 and was "consistent with our cases that
distinguish prosecution for general crimes from persecution."3' The court
stated further that Ms. Fisher "merely has established that [she] faces a
possibility of prosecution for an act deemed criminal in Iranian society,
which is made applicable to all [women] in that country." 32
Again, a court has failed to consider gender-based persecution when all
women in a country or society face that persecution. Furthermore, in using
the prosecution-persecution distinction, the Ninth Circuit dismisses gender-
based persecution when a government uses its legal system to mandate that
persecution. Thus, women face yet another burden when making gender-
based asylum claims under existing refugee law. In contrast, claimants
making a case on account of political opinion or religion are not precluded
from making an asylum claim merely because a government has
criminalized their particular political party or religion.
The issue of persecution against women, analyzed in the framework of
society-wide persecution in Iran, arose again in 1994. In Safaie v. INS, the
claimant made a particular social group and political opinion claim. 33 Ms.
Safaie belonged to a group of women who, because of their political
opinion, refused to conform to Iran's strict customs and laws relating to
dress and behavior. Ms. Safaie was detained, interrogated for eight hours,
expelled from her university and threatened with further punishment on
account of her not accepting these strict customs and laws.34
In her claim for asylum, Ms. Safaie asserted that, "Iranian women, by
virtue of their innate characteristic [their sex] and the harsh restrictions
placed upon them, are a particular social group. ' 35 The Immigration Judge
denied her claim and the BIA affirmed, noting that her detention was an
attribute of a generally oppressive regime and not persecution within the
Immigration and Nationality Act.36 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the BIA
conclusions and stated further that it believed that a category based solely
on gender "is over-broad, because no factfmder could reasonably conclude
that all Iranian women had a well-founded fear of persecution."' The
court, using a classic 'blame the victim' response, also stated that Ms.
Safaie did not fight her persecution with a "missionary fever" and therefore
29. See id. at 962.
30. Id. at 961.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 962.
33. Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994).
34. See id. at 638-39.
35. Id. at 640.
36. See id. at 639.
37. Id. at 640.
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her opposition was not strong enough to "suffer the severe consequences of
noncompliance."38 This analysis places a greater burden on women than on
claimants seeking asylum on account of the other categories. For example,
exercising some degree of self-preservation by hiding one's political
opinion or religion have not been held to preclude a grant of asylum.
In Sharif v. INS, a case similar to Fisher and Safaie, the Seventh Circuit
examined whether an Iranian woman should be granted asylum on account
of gender-based persecution.39 The court found that neither persecution
shared by the general population nor punishment resulting from violating
Iran's laws of general applicability amounted to persecution for purposes of
asylum eligibility.4° In coming to this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit
relied on Fatin and reiterated the analyses in Fisher and Safaie.
In In re Fauziya Kasinga, the claimant was successful in using the
particular social group category. 41 In Kasinga, however, the BIA did not
conclude that Ms. Kasinga faced persecution on account of her gender, but
rather gender-specific persecution on account of a narrowly defined
particular social group. In this case, the particular social group was limited
to persons who were: (1) young women; (2) members of the Tchamba-
Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo; (3) not having undergone female genital
mutilation (FGM); and (4) who opposed the practice of FGM. Though this
case creates a positive precedent that will aid women in similar
circumstances, it reinforces the idea that persecution against women on
account of gender alone is insufficient to seek asylum.
B. WOMEN AS A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
As the preceding cases illustrate, human rights advocates have in recent
years attempted to use the particular social group category to offer
protection to persons persecuted on account of gender. The travaux
priparatoires42 of the Refugee Convention offers little illumination of the
intended scope of this category. During the Convention, Swedish delegate
Sture Petren introduced this category as an amendment to the international
definition.43  In introducing this amendment, Mr. Petren stated that
"experience has shown that certain refugees have been persecuted because
they belong to particular social groups" and, thus, a category designed to
cover them should be included.44 The precise interpretation of this phrase,
38. Id.
39. Sharif v. INS, 87 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
40. See id. at 935.
41. In re Fauziya Kasinga, Interim Dec. 3278 (B.I.A. 1996).
42. A term in international law literally meaning "preparatory work." Similar to the term
"legislative history" in domestic U.S. law.
43. See generally Connors, Legal Aspects of Women as a Particular Social Group, supra
note 9.
44. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3 (1951).
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however, has long been the subject of academic debate.45
U.N. and U.S. jurisprudence arrive at differing interpretations
regarding the scope of protection offered by the particular social group
category. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Handbook requires only "similarity of background, habits or social status"
to constitute a social group.46 U.S. case law, however, offers a more
narrow definition. In In re Acosta the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals
concluded that:
persecution on account of membership in a particular social group
encompasses persecution that is directed toward an individual who
is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common
immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic might be an
innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some
circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as military
leadership or land ownership. The particular kind of group
characteristic that will qualify under this construction remains to be
determined on a case-by-case basis. However, whatever the
common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that
members of the group either cannot change or should not be
required to change because it is fundamental to their individual
identities or consciences. 47
As examined above, U.S. courts have consistently interpreted the
Acosta definition as requiring another variable besides sex or gender to
demarcate the social group from women generally.48
At its thirty-sixth session, the Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner's Programme issued a note on refugee women and
international protection. Of particular interest was paragraph 10, which
states that:
[for] women who face harsh and inhuman treatment because they
are considered as having transgressed the social mores of their
society, consideration should be given by States to interpreting the
term "membership of a particular social group", as mentioned in
article 1 (A) (2) of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention,
to include women belonging to this category.49
45. See generally Connors, Legal Aspects of Women as a Particular Social Group, supra
note 9; Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution
Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 509 (1993).
46. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, at 19, U.N. Doe. A/AC.96/Z11 (1979).
47. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
48. See, e.g., Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
49. Note on Refugee Women and International Protection, Sub-Committee of the Whole
on International Protection, U.N. Executive Committee of the igh Commissioner's
[Vol. 11:2
The developing particular social group category, as the cases
previously discussed illustrate, is mirrored in U.S. domestic refugee law
where gender-related asylum claims have received increasing attention
from advocates, the INS and the courts.
The use of the particular social group category, however, is not without
problems. Although U.S. courts have stated that sex or gender can define a
social group, decisions have required another variable to demarcate the
social group from women generally.50 As in G6mez, discussed supra,
persecution on account of gender was insufficient to qualify as a refugee.
And as demonstrated by Fatin, discussed supra, persecution under the
particular social group category needs to be to a greater degree than the
persecution suffered by women in general. To date, there has been no case
in which sex or gender on its own has been sufficient to establish
membership in a particular social group.
51
C. GUIDELINES FOR ADJUDICATING GENDER-BASED ASYLUM CLAIMS
In 1991, the UNHCR published a list of recommendations entitled
Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women (UNHCR Guidelines).52
These guidelines address the particular concerns of women while in flight,
in refugee camps, and during the asylum determination process. These
guidelines presented a ground-breaking policy statement which signaled
that refugee-receiving countries need to treat gender-based persecution as a
valid basis for obtaining refugee status. Notably, however, the UNHCR
Guidelines did not advocate altering the definition of refugee to include a
gender category. 4
The UNHCR Guidelines state that:
[e]nsuring the protection of refugee women requires adherence not
only to the 1951 Convention [Relating to the Status of Refugees]
and its 1967 Protocol but also to other relevant international
instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols of
1977; the 1966 Human Rights covenants [the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Covenant on Civil
Programme, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/39 (1985).
50. See, e.g., Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
51. See generally Connors, Legal Aspects of Women as a Particular Social Group, supra
note 9.
52. Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/67 (1991) [hereinafter Guidelines on the Protection of
Refugee Women].
53. PAMELA GOLDBERG, ASYLUM LAW AND GENDER-BASED PERSECUTION CLAIMS,
IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS 3 (1994); Valerie L. Oosterveld, The Canadian Guidelines on
Gender-Related Persecution: An Evaluation, 8 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 569, 574 (1996).
54. See generally Audrey Macklin, Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories, 17
HUM. RTS. Q. 213 (1995).
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and Political Rights]; the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the Declaration of the
Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed
Conflict; the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age
for Marriage and Registration of Marriages; the Convention on the
Nationality of Married Women; and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child.5
The UNHCR Guidelines state further that "[w]hile individual States
may not be parties to all of these instruments, they do provide a framework
of international human rights standards for carrying out protection and
assistance activities related to refugee women. 56 It is notable that the
UNHCR stated that these international instruments "provide a framework"
of standards for carrying out "protection and assistance" to refugee women.
From this statement, it can be surmised that States are expected to
recognize the types of gender-specific persecution proscribed in these
instruments as grounds for asylum.
The UNHCR Guidelines address certain gender-based persecution
which is on account of women transgressing social mores. The UNHCR,
however, recognizes the difficulty posed by the current definition of
refugee, stating that:
[t]he claim to refugee status by women fearing harsh or inhumane
treatment because of having transgressed their society's laws or
customs regarding the role of women presents difficulties under
[the 1951 Convention definition of refugee]. As a UNHCR legal
adviser has noted, transgressing social mores is not reflected in the
universal refugee definition. Yet, examples can be found of
violence against women who are accused of violating social mores
in a number of countries. The offence can range from adultery to
wearing of lipstick. The penalty can be death. The Executive
Committee of UNHCR has encouraged States to consider women
so persecuted as a social group to ensure their coverage.5
7
The UNHCR Guidelines also address sexual discrimination, stating
that:
[w]omen may also flee their country because of severe sexual
discrimination either by official bodies or in local communities.
Protection from sexual discrimination is a basic right of all
women... and discrimination can constitute persecution under
55. Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, supra note 52, at 7-8, 36.
56. Id.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
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certain circumstances.58
The UNHCR Guidelines have advanced refugee law by enumerating
the body of international instruments which create the framework of
standards within which to carry out protection and assistance activities
related to refugee women and by expressly stating that transgression of
social mores and sexual discrimination can rise to the level of persecution.
This advancement, however, only deals with broadening the definition of
persecution. These guidelines still require women who have been
persecuted or have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of gender
to be able to fit their situation into one of the five existing categories (race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group and political
opinion) before they are able to seek the protection otherwise offered by
refugee law.
In 1993, Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) issued
Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related
Persecution (Canadian Guidelines).59 These guidelines were updated in
1996.60 The Canadian Guidelines are designed to incorporate the UNHCR
Guidelines into Canadian asylum decision-making and have two stated
goals: first, to heighten the sensitivity of IRB decision-makers to the unique
problems women refugees face, and second, to provide a method of
analysis within which to evaluate a woman's claim to refugee status.
61
The Canadian Guidelines have weaknesses similar to the UNHCR
Guidelines. In addition, the Canadian Guidelines have been criticized
because they are not binding upon Canadian asylum decision-makers and
only apply to those women who apply for asylum inside Canada but not to
women who apply for Canadian asylum from abroad, including from
within refugee camps.62 The former criticism is not likely to change any
time soon. The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board has recognized
this criticism, but in response has stated that it abides by a principle of
independent decision-making, and that binding guidelines "could
potentially offend this principle." 63 The Canadian Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, which oversees the IRB,
concurred, "concluding that there are no compelling reasons to elevate the
Guidelines to binding status."
58. Id.
59. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CANADA, GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE
CHAIRPERSON PURSUANT TO SECTION 65(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT: WOMEN REFUGEE
CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION (1993).
60. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CANADA, GUIDELINES ON WOMEN REFUGEE
CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION UPDATE (1996).
61. See Oosterveld supra note 53.
62. Id.
63. NURIEHAN MAWAN, CENTRE FOR REFUGEE STUDIES, YORK UNIVERSITY,
PRESENTATION FOR THE CONFERENCE ON GENDER ISSUES AND REFUGEES: DEVELOPMENT
IMPLICATIONS 7-8 (1993).
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In 1995, following Canada's lead, the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) issued a memorandum to all INS Asylum
Officers setting forth guidelines for adjudicating women's asylum claims
(U.S. Guidelines).64 In drafting this memorandum, the INS relied in part on
the UNHCR and Canadian Guidelines.
The U.S. Guidelines have two aims: first, to "set out procedural
considerations for [U.S.] asylum officers that take into account the
particular complexities often present in gender-based claims;" 65 and
second, to "set out what [the U.S.] believe[s] are the cardinal legal
principles governing gender-based claims."
66
The U.S. Guidelines, however, cite G6mez, Fatin and Safaie in
determining that persecution solely on account of gender is insufficient for
an asylum claim under U.S. law.67
IV. CURRENT TRENDS
A. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES: GENDER-
RELATED PERSECUTION
1. UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions
In 1985, the Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (EXCOM) issued Conclusion No. 3968 in which it "noted that
refugee women and girls constitute the majority of the world refugee
population and that many of them are exposed to special problems in the
international protection field."69 Conclusion No. 39 also:
stressed the need for such problems to receive the urgent attention
of Governments and of UNHCR and for all appropriate measures
to be taken to guarantee that refugee women and girls are protected
from violence or threats to their physical safety or exposure to
sexual abuse or harassment.70
Most importantly, Conclusion No. 39:
64. PHYLLIS COVEN, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CONSIDERATIONS FOR ASYL.Mi OFFICERS
ADJUDICATING CLAIMS FROM WOMEN (1995), reprinted in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 771
(1995).
65. Lori L. Scialabba, The Immigration and Naturalization Service Considerations for
Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women, 1997 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L.
174 (Special Issue).
66. Id.
67. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Gender Guidelines, Considerations for
Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women, 7 INT'L J. REFUoEE L. 700
(1995).
68. Refugee Women and International Protection, U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, Executive Committee Conclusion, No. 39 (1985).
69. Id. I (c).
70. Id. I (e).
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Recognized that States, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free
to adopt the interpretation that women asylum-seekers who face
harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the
social mores of the society in which they live may be considered as
a "particular social group" within the meaning of Article 1 A(2) of
the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention.
71
In 1993, EXCOM issued Conclusion No. 73, which called upon State-
parties to the Refugee Convention and the UNHCR to ensure the equal
access of women and men to refugee status determination procedures. 72 In
addition, EXCOM supported the recognition as refugees of persons with a
well-founded fear of persecution through sexual violence.73 In arriving at
its conclusion, EXCOM:
[noted] with grave concern the widespread occurrence of sexual
violence in violation of the fundamental right to personal security
as recognized in international human rights and humanitarian law,
which inflicts serious harm and injury to the victims, their families
and communities, and which has been a cause of coerced
displacement including refugee movements .... 74
EXCOM, however, has not addressed the topic of creating a gender
category within the international refugee definition. It merely recognizes
sexual violence and transgression of social mores as forms of persecution
that, if used on account of one of the five existing categories (race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, and political opinion),
would qualify a person for refugee status.
In 1996, EXCOM issued Conclusion No. 79 which, inter alia,
addressed the needs of refugee women.75 Conclusion No. 79 stated that
EXCOM:
Recalls its request that UNHCR support and promote efforts by
States towards the development and implementation of criteria and
guidelines on responses to persecution specifically aimed at
women, welcomes in this context the convening by UNHCR in
February 1996 of the Symposium on Gender-Based Persecution,
the purpose of which was to share information on States' initiatives
in this respect, and encourages UNHCR to continue and strengthen
its efforts for the protection of women having a well-founded fear
of persecution; and calls on States to adopt an approach that is
71. Id. I (k).
72. Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
Executive Committee Conclusions, No. 73, para. (c) (1993).
73. Id. I (d).
74. Id. .1.
75. General Conclusion on International Protection, U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, Executive Committee Conclusions, No. 79 (1996).
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sensitive to gender-related concerns and which ensures that women
whose claims to refugee status are based upon a well-founded fear
of persecution for reasons enumerated in the 1951 Convention and
its 1967 Protocol, including persecution through sexual violence or
other gender-related persecution, are recognized as refugees.76
B. UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
At its fiftieth session on March 4, 1994, the Commission on Human
Rights adopted resolution 1994/45, entitled "The Question of Integrating
the Rights of Women into the Human Rights Mechanisms of the United
Nations and the Elimination of Violence against Women, ' 77 in which it
decided to appoint, for a three-year period, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy as
Special Rapporteur to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights on Violence
against Women-Its Causes and Consequences. This appointment started
an evolutionary process within the Commission in regards to gender-based
persecution.
In 1996, Ms. Coomaraswamy's report took a slightly stronger position
than that taken by the UNHCR Executive Committee by recommending
that "[rlefugee and asylum laws should be broadened to include gender-
based claims of persecution, including domestic violence. ' 78
Ms. Coomaraswamy's report focuses particularly on domestic violence
as a violation of human rights. The report lists a number of manifestations
of domestic violence, including: (1) women-battering; 79 (2) marital rape;80
(3) incest;81 (4) forced prostitution; 82 (5) violence against domestic
workers;83 (6) violence against the girl child;84 (7) sex-selective abortions
and female infanticide;85 and (8) traditional practices affecting the health of
women and children including female genital mutilation and religious
extremism.
86
In its resolution 1996/49, the Commission on Human Rights welcomed
Ms. Coomaraswamy's report. The Commission expressed its deep
"concern that some groups of women, such as... refugee women... are
especially vulnerable to violence." 87 The Commission, however, did not
76. Id. I (o).
77. U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/RES/1994/45 (1994); C.H.R. Res. 1994/45, U.N. Doc. E11994/24
(1994).
78. U.N. Doc. EICN.411996/53 (1996).
79. Id. at 10-12.
80. Id. at 13, 18-19.
81. Id. at 14-15, 19-20.
82. Id. at 14-15, 20-21.
83. Id. at 15-16, 21,22-23.
84. Id. at 15, 24-25.
85. Id. at 25-27.
86. Id. at 28-30.
87. U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/RES/1996/49 (1996); C.H.R. Res. 1996/49, U.N. Dc. E/1996/23
(1996).
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address the causes of refugee flight nor expressly supported the report
recommendation that refugee and asylum laws be broadened to include
gender-based claims of persecution.
Ms. Coomaraswamy's next report in 1997 did not focus much attention
on gender-based persecution and refugee women, however, the
Commission adopted resolution 1997/24 that, inter alia, encouraged Ms.
Coomaraswamy to continue her study on violence against women and
renewed her mandate for three additional years.8 8 In accordance with this
resolution, Ms. Coomaraswamy produced a report in 1998 containing a
section entitled "Violence against Refugee and Internally Displaced
Women."' 9  With this report, the Commission was able to delve
substantially into the issue of gender-based persecution and refugees.
In her 1998 report, Ms. Coomaraswamy looked at both violence against
women as a basis for and consequence of flight.90 Ms. Coomaraswamy
noted that "women have fled when the authorities have failed to protect
them from physical abuse, including domestic violence and rape, inflicted
as punishment for failing to conform to the social or cultural norms
advocated by their attackers." 9' She noted further that "these and other
forms of gender-based violence may cause women to flee their homes to
become internally displaced or to leave their country and seek refugee
status under the [Refugee] Convention." 92
Ms. Coomaraswamy noted that "if the [Refugee] Convention
recognized persecution because of gender, individual women would then
merely have to prove that they were persecuted because they were women
rather than proving that they were members of a social group of persecuted
women with common beliefs and practices." 93  In her final
recommendations, however, she merely encouraged that governments
"seek to remove legal and administrative barriers to women seeking asylum
on the basis of gender-based persecution." 94
In its resolution 1998/12, the Commission welcomed Ms.
Coomaraswamy's report. 95 And although the Commission only stressed
that States must exercise due diligence to prevent violence against refugee
and internally displaced women, without addressing the issue of refugee
status on account of gender persecution,96 it called upon States to
88. U.N. Doc. EICN.4/RES/1997/24 (1997); C.H.R. Res. 1997/24, U.N. Doc. E/1997/23
(1997).
89. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 (1998).
90. Id. at 33.
91. Id. at 34.
92. Id. at 34.
93. Id. at40.
94. Id. at 45.
95. U.N. Doc. EICN.4/RES/1998/12 (1998); C.H.R. Res. 1998/12, U.N. Doc. E/1998/23
(1998).
96. Id.
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"mainstream a gender perspective... into national immigration and
asylum policies, regulations and practices, in order to extend protection to
those women whose claim for protection is based on gender-related
persecution.
97
Although in 1999 the Commission did not specifically revisit the
refugee issue as it relates to women, it did decide to continue consideration
98
of the question of violence against women. The evolution of the
Commission's normative framework regarding gender-based persecution is
quite promising, and hopefully the Commission will further develop and
clarify this norm.
C. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ON REFUGEE LAW
In 1997, Amnesty International issued its report entitled Refugees:
Human Rights Have No Borders9 in which it outlined why persons flee,
why they need protection and the system that should provide that
protection. In its report, Amnesty International made several
recommendations regarding refugee women. In particular, Amnesty
International stated that "States should, at a minimum, adopt and
implement the recommendations of the UNHCR Guidelines on the
Protection of Refugee Women and the numerous EXCOM Conclusions
concerning refugee women." ° Furthermore, Amnesty International stated
that:
Governments should recognize that women may be forced to flee
as a result of persecution in the form of sexual violence or other
gender-related abuses, as acknowledged by the world's
governments in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
adopted in 1995. Governments should ensure that asylum
decision-makers understand that sexual violence and other gender-
related abuses can constitute persecution under the U.N. Refugee
convention definition of a refugee.101
Regarding situations like Iran and Afghanistan, where broad-based
gender persecution occurs, Amnesty International recommends that:
Governments should offer protection to women who fear
persecution because they will not conform to, or have transgressed,
gender-discriminating religious or customary laws or practices of
their society. Governments should recognize that asylum claims
on these grounds fall within the ambit of the U.N. Refugee
97. Id.
98. U.N. Doc. EICN.41RES/1999117 (1999).
99. AMNESTYINT'L, REFUGEES: HuMANRIGHTsHAvENoBoRDERs (1997).
100. Id. at 114.
101. See id.
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Convention and international human rights instruments. 0 2
Although not explicitly mentioned in this report, the addition of a
gender category to refugee definition would provide a method by which
Amnesty International's recommendations could be implemented.
D. THE BEIJING DECLARATION AND PLATFORM FOR ACTION
The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (The Beijing
Declaration0 3 also encouraged the dissemination and implementation of
the UNHCR Guidelines.1 4 The Beijing Declaration also noted that
"[w]omen often experience difficulty in some countries of asylum in being
recognized as refugees when the claim is based on [sexual violence or other
gender-related persecution." 105
Although the Beijing Declaration called upon governments to:
Apply international norms to ensure equal access and equal
treatment of women and men in refugee determination procedures
and the granting of asylum, including full respect and strict
observation of the principle of non-refoulement through, inter alia,
bringing national immigration regulations into conformity with
relevant international instruments, and consider recognizing as
refugees those women whose claim to refugee status is based upon
the well-founded fear of persecution for reasons enumerated in the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967
Protocol, including persecution through sexual violence or other
gender- related persecution .... 106
However, it did not expressly address adding gender to the existing
Refugee Convention definition of refugee.
V. CONCLUSION: THE OMISSION OF A "GENDER"
CATEGORY IMPAIRS THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS
As the cases discussed above demonstrate, the omission of a gender
category has resulted in a lack of protection for many women fleeing
persecution. The use of the particular social group category has proved
ineffective. This ineffectiveness is particularly apparent in situations where
women come from countries and societies in which they are persecuted
generally. As stated above, the particular social group theory is flawed
because it requires the female claimant to distinguish her persecution as
102. See id.
103. Beijing Declaration, supra note 2.
104. Id. 129.
105. Id. 9 137.
106. Id. I 149(h).
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greater than that of the average woman. 1 7 The various guidelines, though
welcome, do not go far enough. The guidelines aid asylum decision-
makers in dealing with the peculiarities of women in flight or seeking
refuge, but do not offer protection to women who are persecuted solely on
account of their gender.
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has invited member States
to make their own individual reforms to include gender.10 8 By expanding its
defmition of refugee to include gender as a sixth category, the United
States can take a position of international leadership in the realm of refugee
law as it applies to gender-based persecution. Such a change would be an
example to other governments, which in turn could expand their respective
definitions and advocate for the expansion of the international definition of
refugee.
107. See generally Kandt, United States Asylum Law, supra note 26.
108. See Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, supra note 52.
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